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The writer of a village study sooner or later faces the problem of
deciding where to close his system. If he wishes to move beyond
straight description he must explain what he observes in terms of
variables which pertain, not to other things which he finds in the
village, but to some larger system which extends beyond it. So in the
Village Studies Project (reported elsewhere in this issue) patterns of
labour utilization in a village are correlated not only with other
internal features such as man/land ratios, but also with variables
describing the village's connections to the outside world, such as
distance from towns. A somewhat different, though complementary,
perspective sees the village as part of a relatively homogeneous
region, and explains regularities within the village in terms of the
position of its region in a larger economic and political system. This
approach connects with the broad notion of dependency theory,
which emphasises the economic and political relations between
nations and regions as reasons for persisting development or
underdevelopment within a nation or region. It stresses that, for
some countries and regions, external relationships, and the dynamics
they condition, tend to dominate internal dynamics.
The village I studied lies in Tuscany (about 150 kms. north of
Rome). The significant point about this location is that Tuscany and
Central and North Italy generally, formed a semi-periphery in the
European world economy which emerged during the 'long' sixteenth
century - 1450 to 1640. Let me first elaborate on the structure of
* Robert Wade has continued research in rural development since joining IDS as
a Fellow in 1972.
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the European world economy and Tuscany's place in it, then go on to
consider the relevance of the centre-periphery dimension to the
differences in present-day social organization between rural Tuscany
and rural South Italy.
Northwest Europe constituted the core area of the European
world economy.2 Here was found a complex variety of economic
activities, including mass-market industries, national and
international commerce in the hands of an indigenous bourgeosie,
and an advanced agricultural organization combining large estates
given over to pastoralism and surplus-producing yeoman farmers. In
line with these economic developments strong central governments
evolved in the core states, with an absolute monarch and a powerful
bureaucracy primarily serving the monarch.
The periphery stretched in a vast band from Eastern Europe (but
not Russia) to the southern part of the Christian Mediterranean, and
on into Latin America. Here, the variety of economic activities was
largely restricted to those connected with a monoculture cash crop
for export to the core, and land organization took the form of large
estates worked by coerced labour. Excluding Latin America, the
periphery experienced a 'second feudalism' during the 15th and 16th
centuries,3 more brutal than the first, at a time when feudal relations
had disappeared in Northwest Europe. For as market opportunities
expanded in the core states, landlords in the periphery faced the
problem of ensuring a supply of low-cost labour, which they did by
effectively tying the peasants to the land. In Latin America, the
Spanish and Portuguese colonists established the same type of land
organization as existed at home by limiting access to land to the
already wealthy (in contrast to North America, where the colonists
came from the core) and by establishing 'second feudalism'
2 The following account of the European world economy is an elaboration on
Wallerstein's study (1972).
This statement is not strictly correct. Whereas Poland, for example, first
experienced a second feudalism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a
response to its peripheral position with respect to Northwest Europe, South
Italy began to experience a second feudalism in the thirteenth century as a
response to its peripheral position with respect to Central and North Italy.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, this trend in South Italy
was intensified due to the change in centre-periphery relations as North-west
Europe became the core, and due also to Spanish colonial policies.
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relationships between landlords and those who worked their land.
The outstanding political characteristic of the periphery was the
absence of strong central government. The local notables who
dominated rural society were relatively invulnerable to the control of
a central bureaucracy; thus rural communities were penetrated by
international market forces more strongly than by the state. The
result was an ecology of settlement in which each rural community
was linked directly to the outside world, not to local urban centres in
a hierarchical division of labour such as existed in the core areas.
The semi-periphery included Central and North Italy and also
(though my knowledge here is less certain) Southern France and
parts of Northern Spain. I shall concentrate on Central and North
Italy. Before the sixteenth century, this had been the core of a
smaller Mediterranean economy. Its cities - Venice, Genova,
Florence, for example - were centres of trade, finance and textile
manufacture. South Italy, Southern Spain, as well as Crete and
Cyprus, were its periphery, supplying it with food and raw materials.
Its bankers and merchants wielded much of what central power
existed in the periphery states. Florentine bankers, for example,
dominated the royal bureaucracy of South Italy from the 13th to the
16th century, holding the right to collect taxes, control monopolies,
manage the export of grain (the principal product), and pay the
salaries of state employees. Land organization around the Central
and Northern cities evolved in response to its core position. During
the 12th and 13th centuries, feudal relations in agriculture gave way
to contractual forms, notably the mezzadria share-farming contract
in which landlord and tenant shared costs and output in roughly
equal proportions. (This same form also came to be widely
distributed through France). Finally, relatively strong, centralized
state structures emerged in the northern and central cities as a
consequence of growing commercialization, with power shared
between aristrocratic and bourgeois elements in a republican form of
government.
When the European world economy was created, Ceiitral and
North Italy de-industrialized. State structures weakened and town
life declined. Power became more concentrated in scattered
countryside domains. But the process did not go so far as to make it
a periphery. The mezzadria form of land organization (which
represents an intermediate form in relation to that of the core and
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that of the periphery) remained dominant. State power remained
stronger in the Centre-North, one indication of which is the much
lower incidence of brigandage in the Centre-North than in the South
(and in Southern Spain and Eastern Europe), where it remained
endemic into the twentieth century.
As the Centre-North dc-industrialized, Spain assumed hegemony
over the South, which it retained as a colony until the eighteenth
century. Far from altering the existing economic and political
structures, Spanish policies served to reinforce them - particularly
because Spain itself remained a semi-periphery and was not able to
back its colonial administration by industrial technology and
organization.Thus, right up to the end of the eighteenth century the
control of the royal bureaucracy extended little beyond the few
cities while in the countryside the nobility held control. Partly
because of their long history as rent-maximizing landlords, the
southern barons did not follow whatever opportunities existed to
invest in manufacturing; and the bourgeosie which began to emerge
in the 18th century showed a similar evaluation of activities as it
turned its attention to land, administration and the legal profession.
The various states of the Centre-North during the same period
remained independent or under the domination of powers which
were themselves part of the industrializing core.
The Napoleonic regime which ruled most of Italy after 1805
brought about a change in land organization in the South which later
rulers could not undo. (The Centre-North, having 'contractualized'
its agriculture centuries before was little affected by the Napoleonic
reforms). After the abolition of feudal privileges, much land in the
South remained concentrated in the hands of the aristocracy. But
increasingly over the 19th century it passed into the hands of the
land-hungry bourgeosie and peasants, giving rise to a class of
medium-sized rentiers and small owner-cultivators. By the turn of the
20th century, a variety of ownership patterns existed in the South:
in some parts, large estates (latifundia) persisted, in others small,
middle-class peasants made up the bulk of the population, and, in
others, medium-sized rentiers predominated. What gave homogeneity
to the South's agriculture was not land ownership but land use.
Whether held in large units or owned by the cultivator, land was
fragmented into small plots, predominantly devoted to cereals. It was
RURAL ORGANIZATION AND CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 71
an agriculture without farms. As one student summarizes the
situation:
'Typically, in the same year, a cultivator with his
nuclear family household worked on a number of plots
under a variety of contracts, varying from seasonal
sharecropping to day labouring. Perhaps he also worked
a plot of his own... This combination was highly
variable. Its variability from year to year determined the
socioeconomic rank of the cultivator as he jockyed for
position in this bitterly competitive society'.
(McDonald and McDonald, 1964: 114).
We are now in a position to look at differences in social
organization between communities in the Centre-North and in the
South. Unfortunately, very little has been published about
communities in the Centre-North - not a single book length
treatment exists - and I shall therefore draw heavily on my own
study of a Tuscan village (thereby violating even the none-too-
rigorous anthropological maxim, 'never generalize from less than two
examples'). One of the most striking differences between this village
and those which have been studied in the South (and what little
published material on the Centre-North exists suggests that my
village is in this respect broadly representative of the whole region4)
concerns the relative importance of corporate and noncorporate
forms of organization: corporate groups are important in the Centre-
North, noncorporate groups unimportant; and vice versa for the
South. Why?
Corporate groups are distinguished from noncorporate groups by a
common interest in property (broadly defined) which is vested in the
group per se.5 Thus, formal voluntary associations are corporate
groups, as are lineages, while coalitions, cliques, and patron-client
chains are noncorporate. Community studies in the South constantly
emphasize the importance attached to informal contractual ties
between individuals and/or nuclear families - ties of kinship, fictive
kinship, friendship and clientship. Take godparenthood, for example.
See Silverman 1968, McDonald and McDonald 1964.
The distinction between noncorporate and corporate groups is from Schneider
et al 1972. The general thesis I advance here owes much to this article.
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The choice of godparents is a crucial one for Southern parents, not
only because the godparenthood tie provides security and assistance
to their children as they grow up, but also because it can create or
reinforce relationships between them and the godparents they
choose. An anthropologist speaking about Sicily described the
godparent-godchild and godparent-parent relationship as
'unextinguishable - it is almost like a blood relationship and it
persists throughout life; woe to one who violates it'.6 Similarly, the
category of 'true friend' is an important one in the South: the 'true
friend' is to be treated like a brother, and a man has only three or
four such relationships at a time. Obligations in these relationships
are chosen, not ascribed, by those who will be obligated, and can be
withdrawn from without loss of assets; they do not entail collective
responsibility. The relationships have powerful ideological and ritual
supports, and it is this, above all, which indicates they are not simply
of secondary importance, as they tend to be in Western Europe and
North America, but are primary in the organization and pursuit of
power.
This pattern of social relations goes with a world view in which
people beyond the family are seen as liable to betray. Distrust in
interpersonal relations is a constantly emphasised theme in South
Italian studies. Hence an individual's relationships with others are
loaded with political significance: he must be constantly on guard to
protect himself from others, and must enter alliances for carrying out
concerted activity on condition that he can withdraw rapidly
without loss. The ideology of kinship, godparenthood and 'true
friendship' can be seen as a response to this situation; as an attempt
to give some stability to a small number of ties, by investing the
fulfillment of obligations in these ties (but not in others) with a
degree of sacredness.
In short, the image is one of individuals constructing a 'nest' of
security for themselves and their families by forming informal
contractual ties with other individuals. The patterns can be
understood as a response to the Hobbesian 'state of nature' in South
Italy, where the state was weak and unable to guarantee property,
agreements, or even life; where stable feudal ties, based on
well-defined reciprocal rights between overlord and dependents, had
6 Quoted in: Themes in Italian Culture, 1953, p. 138.
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long since given way to coercive relations between rent-maximizing
landlords and their tenants; and where, since the Napoleonic land
reform of the early 19th century, intense competition existed for
access to land, leading to a highly fragmented and unstable land
organization. It is not surprising, therefore, that corporate groups,
such as cooperatives, civic amenities societies, and political parties
are relatively few and operate with difficulty. Similarly, it is not
surprising that when indigenous trading and manufacturing activity
did begin in the South, it was organized, not in joint stock companies
as in Western Europe, but in loose coalitions of 'friends', who came
together to pool resources and attempted to reduce their risks by
emphasizing the ties of 'true friendship' which bound them. But this
form of organization is not capable of the efficiency and power of
a more bureaucratic form, which is one (perhaps minor) reason why
industrialization in South Italy has continued to lag behind the
North. Similarly, because collective action is difficult, political
demands cannot be made on behalf of large numbers of people;
'interest aggregation' is limited to small and particularistic patron-
client chains. This, too, tends to perpetuate the South's position of
dependency within the Italian state, by limiting the pressure that
can be applied for a greater share of state resources and protection
to be given to the South.
In Tuscany, where the state presence in rural communities has
been strong for centuries, where standardized contractual relations
existed between landlords and tenants, and where urban-industrial
influences emanating from the Northern cities in the late 19th
century penetrated more deeply than in the South, one finds much
less stress on the kinds of informal contractual ties described above.
Individuals did not face the same risks, and so did not need to
protect themselves by constructing a web of special relationships. In
my village, several informants had trouble recalling who their
godparents were, and everyone agreed that the choice of godparent
was not a particularly important matter. There was nothing
approaching the Southern institution of 'true friendship', and the
evidence suggests that as far back as living memory goes the
patron-client form of organization has been rather weak. Certainly
poor people approached the wealthy for personal assistance; but
stable patron-client blocks did not emerge - so that today, for
example, people are not identified as having been clients (or
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supporters) of family X. As well as the general reasons suggested
above, the specific reasons why patron-client chains were not a basic
form of organization are that in this particular village the large
landlords (who held estates ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 hectares)
were absentee, the largest landowners resident in the village (with
between 50 ha. and 200 ha.) had too little prestige and influence in
urban society to be of much help, and the state officials and
professionals resident in the community tended to be outsiders
whose promotion prospects did not depend on their power base in
the community. To what extent similar features were found in other
villages of the region is not known.7
Conversely, voluntary associations were relatively well developed.
Many villages boasted a band, a confraternity, a sports club, drama
club, one or more work cooperatives. The League of Mezzadri was a
powerful force limiting the exactions of landlords, and it played a
major part in spreading and channelizing the unrest which swept
through parts of North and Central Italy in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. Joint stock companies were much more frequent in
the Centre-North than in the South, and political parties had greater
impact there. Thus, the kind of social organization which evolved in
the Centre-North as a response to its more central position in the
European world economy helped to maintain its economic advantage
over the South.
This is not to say that important differences do not exist between
social organization in the Centre-North and in the core region further
to the north. It would be misleading to portray the villages of Central
and North Italy as humming with associational life. For while many
formal associations do exist (whether with the same or lower
frequency than in core areas is a question on which I have no
information), they commonly operate with difficulty. The smooth
operation of formal associations depends on what has been termed
the 'institutionalization of suspicion'; 8 on rules which provide for
' Silverman (1965), however, reports a classic patron-client form of organization
for an Umbrian village prior to the Second World War. In refining the general
argument of this paper, a clear distinction would have to be made between
Tuscany on the one hand, and Umbria and the Marches on the other. Although
ail are included in 'Central Italy', the latter were part of the Papal state, and
experienced a history somewhat more like that of the South than did Tuscany
and the rest of Central and North Italy.
8 See Dore 1971.
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periodic checks on the propriety of those to whom responsibility is
delegated - the audit and the regular re-election of officers, for
example. The existence of these regular checks helps ensure that
relations between the membership and officers are based on mutual
trust; in this sense, suspicion is institutionalized and kept within
bounds. But because there is, in Central Italy, as in the South, a
general predisposition to believe that other people will betray in
order to follow their own interests (how much stronger it is in the
South is a question that the literature provides no evidence on),
suspicions of the leadership are not contained by the institutionalized
procedures. One response has been to multiply thc formal safeguards.
So a manual of rules for mezzadri leagues, written in 1902, stated
that the head of a group required a four-fifths majority to be elected;
that all the accounts were to be open to any member at any time;
that when disputes arose with employers the representatives of the
league must have the authorization of each member before starting
negotiations. Similarly, the confraternity in the village where I
worked elected two treasurers at once during the years from when it
began in the early 19th century up to about 1850, and thereafter it
elected one treasurer and one auditor, specifying that the auditor
could not be within a certain kinship distance of the treasurer. The
consumer cooperative which started in the early 20th century also
used a variety of safeguards: meticulous and full minutes of
meetings; three election scrutineers, who sometimes submitted a
written report; three auditors; a rule that kinsmen of employees
could not be auditors; and a practice of sending at least two
committee members to make purchases from farmers. One finds
today that elected officials of voluntary associations are liable to
come in for heavy criticism on the grounds that they are using their
position to benefit themselves - though the criticism is never
expressed face-to-face. The effect is to reduce competition for
leadership, for no prestige is gained through activity of this kind, and
to make elected officials wary of innovating. Moreover, the
associations have little place in the organization of power (the
League of Mezzadri was an exception). Partly because of the
weakness of the Italian state after Unification (1861) and the
corresponding strength of local power-holders, the Italian
government structure does not provide for direct relations between
groups of citizens and administrators; rather it centralizes
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decision-making firmly within the bureaucracy, thereby - in
intention - overcoming local privilege. In practice, the governmental
structure is open to outside manipulation at every level. But the rules
arc followed to the extent that manipulation goes through personal
relationships, rather than through open and regularized consultation
between administrators, politicians, and groups of citizens with
common interests. On the ground at village level, this means that the
commune administration makes decisions without attempting to
determine opinions from a cross-section by those affected; and this
limits the power of voluntary assocations.
Thus, in terms of the importance of formal common-interest
associations and of informal coalitions and cliques based on kinship,
fictive kinship, friendship and clientship, Central Italy is intermediate
between Northwest Europe and South Italy. I have argued that this
correlates with differences in the pattern of economic and political
developments in these three areas, and that the whole bundle of
differences can be explained in terms of their position as core,
semi-periphery and periphery in the European world economy and
the conditions which their position gave rise to. The next step might
be to apply the same perspective to the analysis of economic and
political development since the 16th century in the 'external areas'
of the European world economy - Russia and India, for example.
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